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Abstract  
Can specific policies support the economic integration of immigrants? Despite the crucial 
importance of this question, existing evidence is inconclusive. Using data from the European 
Social Survey, we estimate the effects of integration and anti-discrimination policies, alongside 
social expenditure and labor market regulation, on the labor market performance of 6,176 non-
European immigrants across 23 European countries. We make three contributions: 1) we 
investigate the distinct role of discrete policy areas for labor market integration outcomes, 2) 
we allow for heterogeneous effects of policies on immigrants with different characteristics, and 
3) we examine immigrants’ occupational attainment while accounting for their selection into 
employment. We find that immigrants’ employment chances are negatively associated with 
national levels of expenditure on welfare benefits but are positively associated with policies 
facilitating immigrant access to social security. We also find that labor market rigidity is 
negatively associated with immigrants’ occupational success; but we find little evidence that 
policies aimed at supporting the transferability of immigrants’ qualifications promote their 
occupational success.  Crucially, our results strongly suggest that anti-discrimination policies 
are important for immigrant economic integration. Yet while these policies are associated with 
greater occupational success for all female immigrants, they seem to be only positively 
associated with the occupational attainment of higher-skilled and non-Muslim immigrant men. 
As this article suggests, anti-discrimination policies can foster immigrants’ labor market 
1 
 
success, yet these policies currently fail to reach those who face the strongest anti-immigrant 
sentiments - that is, unskilled male immigrants and Muslim immigrant men. 
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Immigrants’ effective integration represents one of the key challenges facing European 
governments (Alba and Foner 2015). The growth of immigration into the European Union (EU) 
since the beginning of the 21st Century has been described as an ‘historic transformation’ 
(Parsons and Smeeding 2006), and Alba and Foner (2015) have persuasively argued that 
Europe’s future will depend on how well it integrates immigrants (see also OECD 2018). 
Immigration can increase human capital, slow population ageing, and foster economic growth, 
thus contributing to the sustainability of European welfare states (Peri 2011). Yet it can also 
fuel labor market competition and anti-immigrant sentiments (Davis and Deole 2019). Such 
anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to reinforce discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
resulting in poorer labor market outcomes for immigrants, either through reduced employment 
or relegation to segregated low-paid sectors (Catanzarite 2000; Tesfai 2019). Barriers to 
immigrant integration not only imply a waste of human capital (Engzell and Ichou 2019) but 
also lower fiscal contributions (Dustmann and Frattini 2014), which can further undermine 
popular support for immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The scope of this integration 
challenge highlights the need for immigrant integration policies that are knowledge-based.  
In this article, we set out to identify those policies that are effective in enhancing 
immigrant economic integration in Europe. We argue that there are compelling theoretical 
reasons to expect policies to affect immigrant economic integration. By immigration policies, 
we refer to those policies that are specifically directed at enabling or restricting immigrant 
access to employment, education and training, and social security. We argue that anti-
discrimination policies, policies providing access to training opportunities, and those 
facilitating the recognition of qualifications should foster immigrants’ occupational attainment, 
but we expect the effects to differ depending on immigrants’ own characteristics. We also 
expect European countries’ national institutions to affect immigrants’ labor market outcomes. 
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By national institutions, we specifically refer to 1) the regulatory framework and organizational 
structures that embed wage and employment determination processes (labor market 
institutions) and 2) the entitlement rules and redistributive principles that define welfare 
provision (welfare provision institutions). We argue that more highly regulated labor markets 
are disadvantageous for immigrants’ occupational attainment, while higher minimum wages 
and lower social security provision can promote immigrant employment.  
To test these propositions requires comparative research encompassing variation in 
regulatory frameworks (policies and institutions) over time and across European countries. Yet 
there exist few comparative studies on immigrants’ labor market incorporation that involve a 
substantial number of European countries (e.g., van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004; Kogan 
2006; van Tubergen 2006; Heath and Cheung 2007; Corrigan 2015). Careful comparisons of a 
small number of countries, each representing a typical welfare/immigration ‘regime,’ can shed 
light on the implications of certain combinations of institutions (e.g., Devitt 2011; Ballarino 
and Panichella 2015; Larsen and Di Stasio 2019), but, besides well-known problems of external 
validity, such regime comparisons cannot test for the contribution of specific policy areas. 
Among studies involving multiple countries, institutional variation (e.g., in wage setting and 
welfare benefits) has been much less comprehensively studied than individual-level 
compositional factors (e.g., differences in individual characteristics of immigrants moving to 
different destinations), local context (e.g., composition of areas where immigrants settle), or 
origin-level factors (e.g., social and economic differences in sending countries) (van Tubergen 
et al. 2004, Spörlein and van Tubergen 2014).  
The evidence we do have offers mixed results on the impact of institutional factors on 
immigrant integration and suggests negligible or ambiguous effects of immigration policies 
(e.g., Corrigan 2015; Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015; Kogan 2006; Fleischmann and 
Dronkers 2010; Heath and Cheung 2007). The lack of consistent evidence in existing studies 
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could be attributable to different selections of countries, the use of different aggregate 
migration indices that cover different aspects of migration incorporation, or the failure to 
distinguish the specific targets for whom particular integration policies are relevant (Bilgili et 
al. 2015).  
In this article, we identify the role of discrete policy domains and institutions in 
promoting the occupational attainment of third-country immigrants who migrated to Europe as 
adults.1 We examine outcomes over the 10-year period from 2002-2012. We claim three main 
contributions. First, while extant research typically focuses on either immigrant access to 
employment (e.g., van Tubergen et al. 2004; Kogan 2006; Heath and Cheung 2007) or 
occupational attainment (e.g., Connor and Koenig 2013; Corrigan 2015) or studies access and 
attainment as separate processes (e.g., Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017), we study 
occupational attainment and access to employment jointly (see Pichler 2011 for a similar 
approach). Studying employment and occupational attainment jointly is important because 
some policies and institutions might have effects on employment, but not on occupational 
attainment (and vice versa). For example, reviews suggest that anti-discrimination legislation 
does not improve immigrant access to employment (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). However, we 
would argue that such legislation is more likely to affect occupational attainment and 
progression (Valfort 2018). Conclusions based on employment access cannot, therefore, be 
extrapolated to occupational performance. Certain policies may help immigrants get ‘any job’ 
whereas others may ease access to ‘better jobs.’  Entering any kind of paid employment is an 
important first step for economic success, but immigrants’ life chances, and their fiscal 
contributions, benefit from accessing jobs with higher wages and better working conditions.2 
 
1 By ‘third-country,’ we refer to immigrants from outside the European Economic Area, who cannot enjoy freedom 
of movement within Europe. 
2 Higher occupational attainment also translates into higher pension entitlements, thereby diminishing the 
immigrant-native gap in old-age income over time (Heisig, Lancee, and Radl 2018). 
5 
 
Hence, we argue, measuring immigrant economic integration in terms of occupational 
attainment represents a more demanding test of societal cohesion. However, estimates for 
policy effects on occupational attainment that are calculated without taking account of selection 
into employment will likely be biased: where access to employment is harder, those individuals 
with jobs will be more positively selected and, hence, more likely to be more successful. 
Selection and occupational attainment should, therefore, be estimated together.  
Second, rather than mechanically using ready-made batteries of aggregate indices of 
integration policies, we investigate the discrete effects of particular, theoretically selected 
integration policies and institutions. Specifically, we analyze five different integration policies: 
anti-discrimination legislation, credentials conversion, labor market rights, job support, and 
access to social security. We also investigate the role of two additional institutional 
characteristics likely to affect immigrant labor market outcomes: welfare expenditure and 
hiring and minimum wage regulations. We contend that studying the specific impacts of these 
policies on immigrant economic integration gives greater insight into which policies actually 
‘matter,’ compared to employing multi-factor indices or fuzzy ‘integration regime’ types (e.g. 
Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Koopmans 2010).  
Third, previous studies have typically assumed that policy and institutional effects on 
immigrant labor market performance are homogenous across the immigrant population, once 
controlling for individual characteristics (e.g., Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Pichler 2011; 
Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015). We contend that, theoretically, such homogenous impacts 
on attainment are implausible. Drawing on arguments from segmented assimilation theory 
(Portes and Rumbaut 1996) and the literature on prejudice and discrimination in Europe (e.g., 
Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Lancee 2019), we posit that specific 
policies may affect skilled and unskilled immigrants, female and male immigrants, and Muslim 
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and non-Muslim immigrants differently.3 As we show, our approach yields analytical pay-offs, 
revealing heterogeneous policy effects.  
To implement these contributions, we exploit variation in policies and institutions 
across 23 European countries and six time points, pooling six rounds of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) for the period 2002-2012, before the onset of the ‘migrant crisis.’ Given its high-
quality procedures and nationally representative sampling, the ESS is regularly used for 
international migration research (e.g., Engzell and Ichou 2019). We focus on 6,176 third-
country nationals residing in European countries. Research consistently identifies different 
outcomes for third-country nationals (e.g., Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017), who are the 
main target of integration policies in European countries. By our sample selection, we ensure 
some comparability in the immigrant populations studied across the 23 countries, though we 
also control for origin context. The ESS provides us with identical individual-level measures 
across countries and over time. We match aggregate measures at the country-year level of a 
range of social indicators relating to immigrant integration policies, employment regulation, 
and welfare expenditure to individual-level ESS records. One caveat raised by analysis of 
immigrant outcomes using the ESS is the potential bias from excluding those who cannot be 
interviewed in the destination-country language; we implement a series of robustness checks 
to engage with this issue. We analyze occupational attainment, using the International Socio-
Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992), and estimate full 
maximum likelihood Heckman selection models to account for immigrant selection into paid 
employment. 
 
3 Following the immigration and immigrant integration literature, we refer to higher- and lower-skilled workers, 
as conceptually the groups of interest. In practice, as shown in the Data section, we can measure only levels of 
educational qualifications, rather than skills, directly in our analysis. Nevertheless, for simplicity and consistency, 
we continue to use the terminology of skill, rather than qualifications, throughout.  
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In the rest of this article, we first review the existing cross-national comparative 
literature on immigrant economic integration. We then set out our theoretical arguments 
relating to the impact of specific policies on occupational attainment. Next, we describe the 
data and measures, before we present and discuss our results. Finally, we offer some 
conclusions.  
 
Immigrant economic integration in Europe 
Despite the dominance of the US literature on immigrant integration (Levy, 
Pisarevskya, and Scholten 2020), there is now a wealth of studies that highlight the particularity 
of the European context, as well as its diversity vis-à-vis immigrant integration (e.g., Lancee 
2019; Alba and Foner 2015). Despite numerous single-country or comparative case studies on 
immigrant incorporation in EU countries (e.g., Kesler 2006; Ballarino and Panichella 2015; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017), few include a large enough number of European societies 
to draw inferences at the macro level (e.g., Adsera and Chiswick 2006; Heath and Cheung 
2007; van Tubergen et al. 2004; van Tubergen 2006; Spörlein and van Tubergen 2014), and 
even fewer explicitly address institutional and policy drivers of immigrant economic 
integration (e.g., Kogan 2006, 2016; Pichler 2011; Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015; Corrigan 
2015; Aleksynska and Tritah 2013; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010). These latter studies are 
most relevant to our research question, even though the majority focus on employment access, 
rather than occupational outcomes (c.f., Pichler 2011 and Corrigan 2015) and some are 
concerned with impacts on both immigrants and the second generation (e.g., Cebolla-Boado 
and Finotelli 2015).  
We argue that immigrant occupational attainment provides more insight into the 
effectiveness of integration policies, which, moreover, can best be understood by focusing on 
the immigrant generation alone. Second-generation outcomes remain of core interest to many 
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societies, but institutional factors shaping their occupational trajectories are distinct. For 
example, children of immigrants are not selected as their parents are, and their outcomes have 
been shown to be fundamentally connected to differences in education systems in the 
destination country (e.g., Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath, 
Rothon, and Kilpi 2008). We, therefore, focus on the factors shaping occupational outcomes 
of the immigrant generation. Judging from existing research, which we go on to discuss, likely 
candidates for drivers of immigrant economic success are individual characteristics, origin-
country factors, community features, and destination-country characteristics.  
In relation to individual predictors of integration, there is a high degree of consensus 
about which are associated with better or worse economic outcomes. A significant body of 
scholarship, for example, shows that human capital variables such as skills or qualifications, 
language proficiency, immigration status, length of stay, and work experience influence 
immigrant labor market attainment in destination societies (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli. 2015; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Heath and Cheung 2007).  Yet attainment differences by 
origin country often persist, even after controlling for observed micro-level factors (e.g., Heath 
and Cheung 2007; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017). These origin differences net of 
observable individual-level characteristics have been referred to as ethnic penalties or ethnic 
residuals (Heath and Yu 2005). Ethnic residuals are likely the outcome of both differential 
employer discrimination (Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; 
Lancee 2019) and immigrants’ unobserved characteristics (Koopmans 2015; Polavieja 2015).  
Cross-national research has clearly demonstrated origin countries’ role in contributing 
to ethnic penalties (Adsera and Chiswick 2006; van Tubergen et al. 2004), and non-European 
immigrants typically demonstrate poorer labor market outcomes in Western European 
destinations (e.g., Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Ballarino and Panichella 2015; 
Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Pichler 2011). Studies differentiating among non-European 
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sending countries have demonstrated that those from richer and more stable societies do better 
in the labor market (e.g., Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010). This finding is consistent with 
compelling evidence that immigrants who come from contexts that are economically, as well 
as culturally and phenotypically, more distant to Europe face the highest levels of prejudice 
and discrimination (Lancee 2019). In the European context, Muslim immigrants tend to be 
perceived by native populations as the most culturally distant immigrant group (Strabac and 
Listhaug 2008; van Tubergen 2006; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Alba and Foner 2015).  
The degree to which immigration regimes are selective will be reflected in observed 
characteristics, such as educational qualifications that proxy for skills levels (Luthra and Platt 
2021; Kogan 2006). However, unobserved characteristics may also be associated with 
immigrant economic or educational selectivity over and above absolute attainment (e.g., 
Feliciano and Lanuza 2017; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Engzell and Ichou 2019). Selection is 
intended to proxy for unobserved characteristics such as drive or motivation, yet Polavieja et 
al. (2018) found a mixed picture for immigrants’ motivation selection, reinforcing the argument 
that people ‘select’ into contexts in which they will do best (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019). Such 
self-sorting highlights the need to take account of destination countries’ institutional and 
economic context when attempting to identify the role of policies for immigrant labor market 
outcomes.  
The existing literature on the role of contextual and institutional factors in immigrant 
economic integration provides relevant insights for our analysis. Van Tubergen et al.’s (2004) 
cross-classified, multi-level model exploring outcomes of different origin groups across 18 
Western societies demonstrated that economic conditions (e.g., local unemployment) at 
reception were significantly correlated with immigrant employment. Spörlein and van 
Tubergen (2014) came to similar conclusions in a study expanded to include 33 non-Western 
countries, and Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010), in their cross-classified model of 13 
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destination countries, also found a clear impact of destination-country unemployment rates on 
immigrant unemployment. Heath (2007), however, found only a weak association between the 
unemployment of the majority population and minority groups’ employment disadvantage in 
his synthesis of 13 country studies. On balance, from these studies, we expect that local 
unemployment levels will shape immigrant access to employment.  
Studying 16 European countries, Kogan (2006) argued that the labor market structure 
is also relevant for immigrant employment outcomes. Specifically, she suggested that countries 
with larger demand for low-skilled labor should benefit immigrants because in these jobs, 
which are often shunned by natives, productivity signals are less important than in high-skilled 
ones. She found a positive relationship between low-skilled-share and employment 
probabilities for both immigrant men and women, though Fleischman and Dronkers (2010) 
failed to replicate this finding.  
Kogan (2006) also argued that more flexible labor markets enable better access for 
immigrants, since flexibility in hiring and firing reduces the costs of potential mismatches for 
– and, therefore, statistical discrimination by – employers (Arrow 1973). She demonstrated that 
higher levels of such recruitment and retention flexibility were associated with better 
employment chances for immigrants. Although this argument is embraced by other authors 
(e.g., Devitt 2011), the empirical finding has not been universally supported: Heath (2007), for 
example, found only weak evidence that strict employment protection leads to greater ethnic 
penalties in unemployment, and Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) found no effect of 
employment protection on immigrants’ unemployment risks.  
Consistent with Corrigan (2015), who, in his study of 14 countries, found clear 
associations between labor market rigidity and occupational status, we argue that employment 
regulation should be more relevant for immigrant occupational success than for labor market 
access. More rigid labor markets may consign immigrants to less-regulated, and less-rewarded, 
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labor market segments but should not, on their own, reduce access to work. While this 
relationship was not observed by Pichler’s (2011) study of 28 destination countries, he 
operationalized a binary measure of occupational success, which might be insufficiently 
sensitive to the impacts of labor market rigidity on mid-range occupations. In addition, his 
sample of immigrants included those of European origin, who are subject to a different 
employment context and different employer expectations.  
Immigrant employment may depend less on labor market rigidity and more on the 
alternatives available. The ‘welfare magnet’ hypothesis states that generous welfare states 
decrease immigrant participation in paid work by offering an ‘outside offer’ on a par with 
wages in the low-skilled segment of the labor market to which they have access (Koopmans 
2010). Polavieja et al. (2018) argue that generous welfare states may also attract immigrants 
who are less motivated to find work. While there is some supporting evidence for the welfare 
magnet argument (Razin and Wahba 2015; Koopmans 2010), results may be misleading in that 
higher spending on social security in general does not necessarily mean that immigrants can 
access more generous welfare benefits. Instead, many states limit the amount, type, or timing 
of access to benefits for third-country nationals (Vintila and Lafleur 2020), rendering levels of 
benefits irrelevant for these immigrants’ participation. Additionally, other studies find no 
‘magnet’ effect of more generous welfare states (e.g., Ponce 2019).  
European states also differ in their integration policies (Huddleston et al. 2015).  It is 
here, however, that research has been least conclusive. Koopmans (2010) argues that 
multiculturalist policies are an obstacle to socioeconomic success because they hinder 
acquisition of the destination-country language and foster the creation of ethnic niches. He 
finds some support for these claims in his eight-country study of employment outcomes, though 
the effects are inferred from the characterization of different regimes rather than by direct 
testing of specific policies. Others argue that policies that actively support immigrants’ labor 
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market participation alongside anti-discrimination policies should have positive impacts on 
immigrant outcomes (Bilgili et al. 2015; OECD 2018). Despite the intuitive expectation that 
integration policies should matter, those studies that have directly tested domains of integration 
policies find few significant effects (e.g., Fleischman and Dronkers 2010; Pichler 2011; 
Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015). 
One possible explanation for this puzzling lack of evidence on the impact of integration 
policies is methodological. Recently, the use of hierarchical lineal modelling has become 
popular in comparative research across the social sciences, including research on international 
migration (e.g., Kogan 2006; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Corrigan 2015). Bryan and 
Jenkins (2016) show, however, that hierarchical models are likely to yield biased estimates for 
second-level co-variates when the number of second-level units is smaller than 25 and that 
binary outcome measures (such as employed or not) are more sensitive to the number of units. 
In such cases, conventional regression with clustered standard errors can provide more robust 
estimates (see also Lewis and Linzer, 2005). In addition, most of the literature reviewed above 
focuses on employment, which, as argued previously, offers a rather limited measure of 
economic integration, particularly with the increasing emphasis in Europe on high-skilled 
migration (Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2014). Focusing only on access inevitably disregards 
the problem of (skilled) immigrants concentrating in low-skilled, poorly paid, and precarious 
jobs in the labor market’s ‘secondary segment’ (Edwards et al. 1975). Finally, many studies 
incorporate European immigrants as part of their immigrant sample, despite the fact that they 
are not the direct targets of most immigrant integration policies (e.g., Gorodzeisky and 
Semyonov 2017; Pichler 2011). The implication is that the estimation approach and sample 
selection need to be appropriate for the question and data under consideration. 
 
Theoretical argument and empirical expectations 
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Our approach to immigrant occupational attainment considers employers’ recruitment 
and promotion practices in different institutional contexts. Employers make hiring decisions 
under uncertainty and information deficits (Arrow 1973). Contractual hazard arises because 
employers cannot observe the potential productivity of their candidates and, hence, must infer 
it from signals. If employers resort to ethnic stereotyping to infer productivity clues from their 
candidates’ origin, they will be committing (statistical) discrimination (e.g., Arrow 1973). This 
practice raises the question of how far regulation can reduce such discrimination. We set out 
three possible channels by which policies can reduce the negative consequences of 
discrimination for immigrants. 
First, to the extent that discriminatory processes are triggered by a lack of unambiguous 
productivity signals, not by employers’ explicit animosity toward certain immigrant groups, 
integration policies that improve information on immigrants’ potential productivity can help 
moderate discrimination (Tibajev and Hellgren 2019; Kogan 2016). Integration policies that 
improve productivity signals include certification policies, that is, policies that help with 
transferring and certifying immigrant credentials, and job support policies, that is, policies that 
allow immigrants to access public employment services and specific training. Beyond 
signaling, these latter policies can also directly increase immigrants’ human capital (c.f., Kogan 
2016).   
Second, integration policies can directly influence the costs for employers of 
discrimination by making all forms of discrimination illegal and by setting up monitoring and 
enforcement schemas to punish such practices (Amiraux and Guiraudon 2010). We can 
distinguish two types of polices that increase the costs of discrimination: 1) anti-discrimination 
policies per se and 2) equal rights policies. While the former aim to stem discriminatory actions 
by targeting employers and providing routes for redress, the latter seek to improve immigrants’ 
rights by guaranteeing equal working conditions and equal representation in works councils 
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(Afonso, Negash, and Wolff 2020). Anti-discrimination policies can also have an indirect effect 
on immigrant labor market opportunities by shifting existing norms about acceptable behaviors 
(Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006; Valfort 2018). This secondary effect on organizational 
cultures might be particularly important, given that enforcement of anti-discrimination 
legislation is typically weak and discrimination practices are hard to prove (Amiraux and 
Guiraudon 2010).   
Third, general labor market regulations can affect employers’ hiring decisions by 
reducing or increasing the costs of job mismatches and/or by allowing for or precluding long 
probationary periods and their associated costs (Giesecke and Gross 2003). For example, if 
temporary contracts can be used for long time periods and for all kinds of tasks (and if such 
contracts entail very low or no termination costs), then the match-or-miss pressure for 
employers is lessened (Kogan 2006) and, hence, statistical discrimination should decrease. 
Rather than labor market access (e.g., Kogan 2006; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010), this 
argument better applies, we would suggest, to hiring immigrants for higher-skilled compared 
to lower-skilled jobs, where the costs of mismatch are greater.  
We, therefore, test the role of these policy and institutional dimensions on immigrant 
occupational outcomes, adjusting for non-random selection into employment (Heckman 1979). 
However, we also expect that these institutional factors differ in their impact according to 
immigrants’ own characteristics. Portes and Rumbaut (1996) distinguished between ‘labor’ 
(i.e., unskilled) and ‘human capital’ (i.e., skilled) immigrants and argued that their divergent 
integration patterns describe a process of segmented assimilation. Although this distinction is 
well established in the incorporation literature (e.g., Biegert 2017), extant research on 
institutional and policy effects on immigrant labor market outcomes tends to assume that such 
effects are uniform across skill groups (e.g., Kogan 2006; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; 
Pichler 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017). By contrast, we contend that immigrant 
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integration policies should be more relevant in assuring higher-skilled immigrants’ 
occupational attainment because these immigrants have the highest attainment potential, one 
that integration policies can help fulfill. By contrast, unskilled immigrants have limited 
opportunities for occupational upgrading regardless and also tend to work in more segregated 
settings, which are likely to be less permeable to policy effects (Frattini and Campa 2020). We, 
therefore, test for heterogeneous effects according to immigrants’ skill levels.  
Statistical discrimination is usually seen as the main driver of employers’ biases (Arrow 
1973). Yet, if employers’ hiring decisions are predominantly driven by what Becker 
(1971[1957]) famously called ‘taste for discrimination’ (i.e., a dislike for particular groups that 
does not respond to information deficits), increasing the quality of productivity signals will not 
help much. Similarly, increasing the costs of discrimination or reducing the costs of job 
mismatches may not outweigh decisions based on deeply ingrained or strongly felt prejudices. 
In the European context, the group most likely affected by this type of discrimination is 
Muslims (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 
2019). Hence, we also test whether anti-discrimination policies have differential effects for 
Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants.  
Furthermore, in the employment equation of our selection model, we incorporate two 
additional institutional features that we expect to be associated with access to employment (and 
only with occupational attainment via their influence on access to employment). These two 
additional institutional measures draw on our earlier arguments concerning the ‘welfare 
magnet’ effect of generous welfare states. Since generous welfare provisions must be 
accessible to immigrants if welfare benefits are to provide the incentives anticipated in the 
welfare magnet literature (Razin and Wahba 2015), we test for both welfare expenditure and 
immigrants’ access to social security benefits, and their interaction, on immigrants’ 




Data and Methods 
 We pool data from the first six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) to form a 
data set comprising 6,176 first-generation immigrants between 16 and 64 years old and living 
in 23 European countries.4 The ESS is a biennial, face-to-face social survey implemented 
across a large number of European countries, using rigorous methodological approaches and 
with academically driven content.5  Not all countries have participated in every round; 
nevertheless, the ESS enables researchers to track attitudes, behaviors, and conditions among 
European populations over time and comparatively. The ESS was not designed as a study of 
immigrants, but its high-quality, rigorous implementation, with high response rates, consistent 
measurement across countries, and measures encompassing birth country, citizenship, religion 
and time of arrival, has rendered it attractive for cross-national analyses of immigrants’ 
experiences, such as ours. One key limitation, however, is that the ESS only conducts 
interviews in the destination-country language, unless a minority language is spoken by five 
percent or more of the population. While previous research has found little evidence of 
systematic bias resulting from this restriction (van Tubergen 2006; Connor and Koenig 2013), 
the ESS may tend to under-sample more recent immigrants, and sampled recent immigrants 
are likely to be biased toward those with greater fluency in the destination-country language 
(Tegegne and Glanville 2019). We, therefore, implement additional analyses to assess any 
potential implications of this bias for our findings. 
Since we are interested in those individuals who are likely to be affected by specific 
immigrant-related policies, we exclude the second generation and the 1.5 generation who 
 
4 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See Online Appendix for full data references.    
5 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/  
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arrived at the destination country at age 13 or earlier. We also include only third-country 
nationals, since it is those subject to EU border control to whom immigration policies typically 
apply. Our data include 132 different non-EU foreign origins, including rich, low-income, and 




Dependent variable  
Our dependent variable is the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom 
et al., 1992), a continuous measure of occupational status that runs from around 19 to around 
90, with higher scores representing occupations that yield higher labor market returns.  
 
Institutional macro-level measures 
We created four different variables based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and Migration Policy Group, 2010). 
MIPEX draws on expert reports and measures the extent to which third-country nationals enjoy 
the same conditions as nationals across different domains. Our four measures operationalize 
the institutional factors we aim to test and relate to the period under study.  
Job support is measured as the average of two items: ‘access to public employment 
services’ and ‘equality of access to education and vocational training’ to capture the degree to 
which policies provide immigrants with support to find the best matching jobs in the labor 
market. 
Labor market rights comprise an average of ‘membership of and participation in trade 
union associations and work-related negotiation bodies’ and ‘guaranteed equal working 
conditions.’ This variable is intended to capture the extent to which immigrants enjoy equal 
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working conditions and are equally empowered to have their interests represented at the 
workplace level. 
Conversion of credentials is formed of the average of items measuring the ‘recognition 
of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU’ and ‘state facilitation of 
recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU.’  
Anti-discrimination covers 34 single items grouped in the following four categories: 
definitions and concepts, fields of application, enforcement mechanisms, and equality policies. 
It is a largely legal concept that captures, for example, the grounds on which anti-discrimination 
legislation operates and the degree to which minorities are informed and supported to take their 
case to the justice system. 
For evaluating the role of labor market rigidity, we include a measure of labor market 
regulation based on the hiring regulation and minimum wage measure provided by the 
Economic Freedom of the World report published by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney, Lawson 
and Hall 2013). This index, derived from employer surveys, measures (i) whether fixed-term 
contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-
term contracts; and (iii) ‘the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to 
the average value added per worker.’ We reverse-code the measure so that larger values 
represent greater rigidity.  
In line with the theoretical arguments outlined above, we include the size of the manual 
sector in each country as a proportion of the overall workforce as a measure of the secondary 
segment. We also account for different national occupational structures by controlling for 
natives’ average ISEI, as measured in the ESS, at the country-year level.6 Controlling for 
natives’ average ISEI in this way renders our measure of occupational attainment relative to 
 
6 This measure of natives’ average ISEI is derived from those born in the destination country, whose parents were 
also born in the destination country. 
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the national context and enables us to capture the extent to which immigrants are prospering 
net of selecting into different contexts.  
We include two further institutional/policy measures in the employment selection 
equation, allowing us, as discussed, to test the potential disincentive effects associated with 
welfare state generosity:  1) public social expenditure, as percentage of GDP (from the OECD) 
and 2) immigrants’ access to social security (from MIPEX, single indicator). In line with 
empirical findings on the relevance of destination-country unemployment rates on immigrants’ 
employment chances (e.g., van Tubergen 2004; Spörlein and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann 
and Dronkers 2010), we control for the (within country-year) regional unemployment rate in 
the selection equation. 
 
Individual-level covariates 
Our key covariate for capturing immigrants’ individual-level skill heterogeneity is level 
of education, measured using a dichotomous variable indicating lower than upper secondary 
education compared to higher education levels (i.e., ISCED 0-2 vs ISCED 3-6). While this 
covariate captures qualifications attained rather than directly measuring skills, we follow 
common practice in using it as an identifiable proxy for skill level (e.g., Poot and Stillman 
2016). To test for specific discrimination and negative stereotyping directed at Muslims, we 
include a dummy constructed from the question on religion, identifying whether the respondent 
was Muslim.  
 
Control variables 
We include age and years of residence in the destination country as covariates. The 
latter is measured in four categories: up to 5 years; 6-10 years; 11-20 years; and 20+ years. To 
account for relevant differences associated with origin country and the finding that those from 
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poorer and less stable countries fare worse in the labor market (Spölein and van Tubergen 2014; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017), we control for the Human Development Index (HDI) 1990 
of immigrants’ birth country, since 1990 approximates the median point in the emigration 
period. We additionally include a measure of whether the local language is spoken at home. 
While not fully capturing fluency in the destination-country language, this measure provides 
some information on capacity in that language (c.f., Maxwell 2010). Since local language 
spoken at home was correlated with employment, but not ISEI, for both men and women, we 
restrict it to the employment equation. Finally, we include dummies for ESS survey round in 
the employment equation. 
 
Model specification 
We estimate a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979), using full maximum 
likelihood, with occupational attainment (ISEI) as our dependent variable. ISEI is observed if 
the respondent is employed and not otherwise. Accounting for selectivity into employment is 
important because where there is a higher bar to accessing employment, those in work are likely 
to be more positively selected, which could bias our estimates of policy effects. By taking 
account of selection, our estimates of occupational attainment are, thus, those which would 
apply, absent differential selection into a job (see Pichler 2011 for a similar approach, though 
using a two-step method). We estimate separate models for men and women, given that 
occupational outcomes and structures are likely to differ across the sexes (Charles 2005). In 
particular, women are more likely not to be in employment (around half our sample of women); 
therefore, the selection issues for those women with an observed occupation are more acute. 
Our model is estimated as follows:  
𝐼𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑗𝑘




where 𝐼𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑗𝑘, ISEI of person j in country-year k, is observed when  
𝛾0 + 𝑍𝑗𝑘𝛾1 + 𝑊𝑘𝛾2 + 𝑉𝑟𝛾3  + 𝑢2𝑗 > 0 
that is, when person j is employed. X and Z are vectors of individual-level variables, and Y and 
W are vectors of institutional variables. V is the year-specific regional unemployment rate. The 
correlation between u1 and u2 is given by 𝜌. 
Both the selection (employed/not) and occupational attainment (ISEI) equations 
include age, education (high/low), and whether or not Muslim. The ISEI equation includes our 
key institutional measures of interest and the measure of immigrants’ average ISEI, as well as 
the measure of origin-country HDI. We identify the employment equation with our measures 
of regional unemployment rate, social expenditure, and access to social security.7 We further 
include an interaction between social spending and immigrant access to social security and 
adjust for our control variables.  
We estimate a series of models to test the role of each different institutional factor of 
interest in turn – namely, job support, labor market rights, job conversion of qualifications, and 
anti-discrimination policies – and combine them in a single model. We test for the role of labor 
market regulation and size of the manual sector across all these models and retain the same 
specification for the selection equation for each. Having evaluated the association between each 
policy indicator both separately and together, we explore heterogeneity in effects for any 
measure with a significant association with ISEI. In practice, this analysis of potentially 
heterogeneous effects only applied to anti-discrimination policies. We interact this measure 
with educational level and Muslim affiliation in line with our theoretical arguments.  
 
Model rationale  
 
7 Since our results were robust to estimating different specifications for men and women, using additional 
individual-level measures, we retain the more parsimonious, consistent specification.  
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Despite the popularity of multilevel models in previous research, as noted above, there 
is increasing attention to some of the problems in using such models to estimate institutional 
contextual effects. The assumption that the countries considered are a random sample from an 
overall population is hard to sustain. In addition, as noted, estimates may be biased when using 
small numbers of observations (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Multilevel models for data, such as 
ours, with a relatively small number of countries measured at repeated points over time are 
often vulnerable to model misspecification (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016), and 
particularly influential cases may drive the results (Van de Meer, T Grotenhuis, and Pelzer 
2010). We, therefore, employ a simpler specification and estimate models on a pooled sample 
of (different) individuals across six waves of data, with the institutional factors for the relevant 
year that the respondent was surveyed as covariates. Although our controls do not exhaust all 
potential sources of heterogeneity across country contexts, we adjust for key factors that could 
potentially confound the estimates of the institutional and policy measures of interest. Of 
course, there are limits to this approach in terms of degrees of freedom, but we strove for a 
wide set of country indicators including a range of both institutional and structural features. To 
avoid underestimating our standard errors for the coefficients, we cluster our standard errors at 
the country-year level (Moulton 1986). There were 191 country-year clusters nested in 23 
countries. Clustering at the country-year level means that we assume that observations are more 
similar within countries in a given year, avoiding the problems highlighted by Schmidt-Catran 
and Fairbrother (2016). The application of such clustered standard errors is regarded as a 
‘conservative strategy,’ as within-country-year correlation is controlled but not explicitly 
modelled (Bryan and Jenkins 2016).  
For clarity and parsimony, we report only our main parameters of interest below, along 
with the key statistics on the selection models – namely, 𝜆, the product of the correlation of 
unobservables (𝜌 ) and the standard error of the residuals (𝜎) in the outcome equation, 
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alongside its standard error,  𝜌, the correlation of the residuals, and the 𝜒2 value of the test for 
independence of the equations, with its p-value. We centered all continuous individual-level 
variables at the country-year level and standardized all macro-level variables.  All variables 
measured prior to standardization are described in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show the associations, for men and women respectively, of our macro-
level variables on ISEI, after accounting for selection into employment. We see from the 𝜒2 of 
the test of independence of equations that, as expected, occupational attainment is not 
independent of employment propensity, particularly for women. The selection equations show 
that social expenditure is negatively associated with employment access, consistent with earlier 
findings on welfare magnet effects (e.g., Razin and Wahba 2015). Yet, interestingly, we also 
see that policies that facilitate immigrant access to social security are associated with higher 
employment rates and that there is no significant interaction between welfare expenditure and 
access to social security policies. These findings imply that the model of ‘welfare magnets’ 
requires some revisiting (c.f., Ponce 2019). Specifically, our findings do not support the 
argument that immigrants who can benefit from more generous social security policies are 
more likely to be unemployed   
Our main findings, relative to our main theoretical expectations, are rather mixed. 
Policies supporting conversion of credentials, contrary to our expectations, are not consistently 
associated with ISEI scores, while labor market rights show a negative, rather than positive 
association. It is possible that labor market rights are associated with aspects of labor market 
rigidity not captured by our measure of labor market regulation, which shows the expected 
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negative effects, though it is only statistically significant at the five percent level for women. 
Job support is associated with ISEI in the full model, but not found in the separate models. 
Again, the association is negative, possibly indicating a remedial role of job support for those 
with fewer labor market options and, hence, negative productivity signaling (c.f., Kogan 2016). 
The one area of policy where we find clear and consistent associations with occupational 
attainment, for both men and women, in both the separate and full models, is anti-
discrimination policies.  
 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Among other factors of interest, the manual sector’s size is, as expected, negatively 
associated with occupational attainment for both men and women, and at the individual level, 
Muslims have strikingly lower occupational attainment, controlling for other individual-level 
factors and adjusting for selection into work. This effect is reduced for women when controlling 
for differences in anti-discrimination polices, suggesting that where such policies are absent, 
Muslim women fare considerably worse.   
Given the consistent results for anti-discrimination policies, we further explored 
potential heterogeneous effects by interacting anti-discrimination policies with immigrants’ 
skill level and whether or not Muslim. As Tables 5 and 6 make clear, the main effect of anti-
discrimination policies shows a clear association with higher occupational attainment. 
However, among men, this positive effect is cancelled out for both Muslims and those with 
lower educational levels. For women, the main negative effect of being Muslim on ISEI 
attainment is not consistent, and unlike their male counterparts, female Muslim immigrants 
appear to benefit, along with other female immigrants, from anti-discrimination policies. 
Immigrant women with low educational levels also cannot be differentiated from immigrant 
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women with higher educational levels in reaping the benefits of anti-discrimination legislation 
(the interaction effect is small and statistically insignificant). The differences in findings for 
immigrant women compared to immigrant men may relate to the fact that immigrant women’s 
occupational settings differ from those of men. Thus, immigrant women with lower educational 
levels may be less segregated from other women and, hence, benefit more from anti-
discriminatory policies, which can affect organizational cultures.  
 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
Robustness 
We carried out a number of robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our analysis 
to different assumptions and specifications. To test for influential outliers, we re-estimated our 
main models, excluding each country in turn. Our results were robust to these exclusions. A 
noted concern with using the ESS to analyze immigrant outcomes is the fact that it does not 
translate the instruments into minority languages unless those minority languages are spoken 
by five percent or more of the population. This restriction has the potential to bias the results 
if those without sufficient destination-country language fluency to participate in the survey are 
systematically associated with both the outcome of interest and key independent variables. It 
is, of course, likely that destination-country language fluency will be associated with 
occupational outcomes, even after selection for employment. However, it is not clear whether 
it is likely to confound the relationship between policy measures and occupational outcomes 
(net of other observables and institutional controls). To address this issue, we implemented a 
number of checks. First, we collated information on the numbers of those in each country-
round who were excluded from the issued sample due to language. We estimated the ratio of 
these cases to all first-generation immigrants (from all countries) in each country-round (see 
Table A1 in the Online Appendix). From these ratios, we created normalized weights (centered 
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at 1, with a range from 0.9 to 1.27) to adjust for the probability of inclusion. We then re-
estimated our full models, adjusting for these weights. Since we do not know the sex of those 
excluded, we estimated the weight for all immigrants and used the same weights for the analysis 
of both men and women. Results are provided in Tables A2 and A3 in the Online Appendix 
and show that despite some small changes in the coefficients, our main results hold, indicating 
that the exclusions are not biasing the relationship between our policy measures and 
occupational outcomes adjusted for employment. Second, given that local language fluency 
increases with time in the destination country (Carliner, 2000; Akresh 2006; Aleksynska and 
Algan 2010), we reanalyzed our models, restricting our sample to those with longer durations 
of stay (>5 years), among whom there should be fewer differences in destination-country 
language fluency by country-cohort. Third, we re-estimated our main models, restricting the 
sample to those who spoke the destination-country language at home, for whom, again, 
differences in language exclusions by country-cohort should not apply. Our findings (provided 
in Tables A4-A7 in the Online Appendix) were robust to these restrictions, again indicating 
that selection bias was not driving our results.  
 
Conclusions 
Immigration to Europe from diverse societies has been posited as an important 
integration challenge (Alba and Foner 2015). European societies devote substantial resources 
to developing and monitoring immigrant integration policies, though typically without clear 
evidence of their impacts (Joppke 2007). To gauge the effectiveness of such policies, 
comparative evidence is needed. Yet there is relatively little cross-country research on the 
effects of policies and institutions on immigrant economic integration in Europe, and the 
evidence produced to date has been inconclusive (e.g., Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; 
Pichler 2011; Gorodzeisky and Semonyonov 2017). In this article, we exploited individual 
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variation in immigrant labor market performance across 23 European countries over a 10-year 
period preceding the current ‘migrant crisis.’ By using disaggregated policy indices, allowing 
for heterogeneous policy effects, and focusing on occupational attainment, while accounting 
for selection into employment, we provide fresh insights into the conditions that can foster 
relatively better economic outcomes for both lower and higher-skilled immigrants. This insight 
is important as policy-makers and researchers attempt to identify which policies actually 
increase immigrant economic incorporation.  
Alongside limited support for a number of policy effects, we found a negative 
association between labor market rigidity and immigrant occupational scores, as well as a 
strong positive association between anti-discrimination policies and immigrant occupational 
attainment. The effect of anti-discrimination policies was, however, heterogeneous: it benefited 
all women equally but, among men, was limited to those who were higher skilled and not 
Muslim.  
Our article contributes to the literature on international migration, both conceptually 
and empirically. We developed specific theoretical arguments as to how policies can influence 
the way in which employers treat third-country nationals by linking macro-level policies and 
institutions to employers’ behavior at the micro level. Moreover, we reported relevant new 
evidence on the potential for policies to promote immigrant integration. In particular, we 
distinguished between three types of policies potentially affecting immigrant performance in 
European labor markets: 1) those that help immigrants better signal their (actual or potential) 
skills (i.e., accreditation and job-support policies); 2) those that target discrimination practices 
directly (anti-discrimination and equal right policies); and 3) those that reduce (increase) 
employer incentives to draw on statistical discrimination by facilitating (hindering) the use of 
flexible forms of employment (labor market policies).  
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As we argued, anti-discrimination policies could not only affect the direct costs to 
employers of discriminating against immigrant employees but also have an indirect impact on 
organizational cultures to facilitate immigrant access to better jobs and career prospects. We 
suggested that such positive effects of anti-discrimination policies were more likely to benefit 
more skilled immigrants seeking access to less segregated occupational sectors and with greater 
potential for advancement. Our results support these skill-heterogeneous impacts of anti-
discrimination policies for men and indirectly suggest that policies have the potential to create 
cultural shifts in employers’ and managers’ willingness to discriminate.  
Our finding that male Muslim immigrants do not benefit from anti-discrimination 
polices could suggest that discrimination against this group is based on distastes that are 
sufficiently strong to outweigh other considerations. In other words, European employers 
appear willing to incur opportunity costs in acting on their prejudices against this group of 
immigrants. Anti-Muslim discrimination may be more widely accepted socially than other 
forms of racial or ethnic prejudice (Creighton and Jamal 2015). An alternative explanation 
would be that Muslim men’s employment is highly segregated in ethnic enclaves that restrict 
occupational opportunities regardless of the policy context (e.g., Koopmans 2015). The 
potential for anti-discrimination cultures to take root and inform treatment may also be stronger 
for less, rather than more, marginalized groups. Segregation and discrimination processes are 
mutually reinforcing, so both explanations are plausible. In any event, this finding is relevant 
to European policy-makers, particularly given concerns about widespread Islamophobia 
(Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and employment discrimination against Muslim men in Europe 
(Di Stasio et al. 2019). 
The effect of anti-discrimination policies on women differed. Muslim women did not 
face a statistically significant additional occupational disadvantage, compared to other women, 
once anti-discrimination policies were controlled, indicating that they benefitted equally with 
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other immigrant women from anti-discrimination policies. The evidence reported in this article, 
therefore, suggests that anti-discrimination polices fail to reach immigrant Muslim men, while 
highlighting their potential to reach immigrant Muslim women, a group that has been regarded 
as particularly vulnerable to labor market exclusion (Khoudja and Platt 2018).  
We also examined the potential disincentive effects of generous welfare provision on 
employment by looking at two further institutional characteristics of destination countries: 
welfare expenditure as a proportion of GDP and policies that facilitate immigrant access to 
social security benefits. Interestingly, we found no evidence for the interaction between 
generosity and access, which would constitute a meaningful ‘magnet.’ This finding offers an 
important caution to popular associations of immigration with welfare usage.  The results 
relating to the impacts of the manual sector’s size on occupational outcomes and the effect of 
regional unemployment rates on immigrant employment chances both are consistent with our 
expectation and earlier research (e.g., van Tubergen et al. 2004; Kogan 2006) and confirm that 
macro-level variation in economic structures and conditions co-determine immigrants’ labor 
market opportunities in Europe.  
As with other attempts to identify policy effects from exploiting cross-national policy 
and institutional variation, this article cannot claim to establish causality, which is the main 
limitation of our approach. Yet, while extant research has typically used highly aggregated 
measures of integration polices, multiple-measure indices, or stylized regime ‘types,’ making 
the direct implications hard to spell out (e.g., Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015; Corrigan 
2015), we have identified specific policy and institutional dimensions by grounding them in 
explicit theoretical expectations regarding employer behavior. This theoretical link between 
fine-grained, macro-level policies and institutions, on the one hand, and micro-level behaviors, 
on the other, makes causal interpretations of our estimates somewhat more plausible. Such 
plausibility is further reinforced by the robustness of our estimates to alternative specifications 
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and various tests for potential selection bias due to the ESS language restriction – an issue that 
has received limited attention in extant research. 
In terms of the policy implications of our findings, we conclude that the best policy mix 
for increasing first-generation immigrants’ labor market performance in Europe is one that 
combines labor market flexibility, to ensure access to occupational opportunities, with anti-
discrimination policies, to foster cultures of inclusion and enable immigrants to fulfil their 
potential and contribute in line with their skills. Our findings also suggest that equal access to 
social security benefits may help, rather than hinder, immigrant economic integration. Finally, 
additional measures to improve the occupational attainment of unskilled male immigrants and 
male Muslim immigrants seem sorely needed for these two sizeable groups of immigrants in 
Europe (Frattini and Campa 2020).  
Our findings also have implications for the wider study of international migration. They 
highlight the need to consider heterogeneity among immigrants when evaluating immigration 
policies. They also illustrate the analytical purchase that can be gained from more precisely 
specifying the potential link between institutions and policies and those specifically targeted 
by those outcomes. Finally, while much research addressing immigrant economic integration 
focuses on employment or occupation separately (e.g. OECD 2018), we make the case that 
occupational outcomes accounting for selection into employment and relative to the 
occupational distribution in destination countries may represent a better measure of successful 
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Which Integration Policies Work? Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual-level variables (N=6,178) 
Continuous measures    Categorical measures  
 Mean SD   Per cent 
Occupational status (ISEI) 38.16 18.44  Female 53.29 
Agea 41.90 11.63  Low education 32.08 
HDI Origin Country 1990a 0.60 0.14  Muslim 20.41 
    Local language spoken at 
home 
55.81 
      
    Years of stay in destination country 
    Up to 5 years 23.24 
    6-10 years 21.75 
    11-20 years 27.61 
    More than 20 years 27.39 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics of contextual variables 
          
MIPEX measures Mean SD Min Max 
Antidiscrimination 59.14 19.46 18.15 87.70 
Conversion of credentials 59.69 26.49 0 100 
Labor market rights 98.69 5.58 75 100 
Job support 68.32 21.72 25 100 
Access to social security 60.47 44.67 0 100 
     
Other measures Mean SD Min Max 
Natives’ average ISEI 42.86 3.53 33.96 52.21 
Proportion of non-tertiary sector 0.33 0.08 0.19 1.30 
Hiring regulation and minimum wage  -6.81 2.35 -10.00 -2.20 
Unemployment rate (regional) 8.22 4.57 2.10 26.70 
Public social expenditure (% of GDP) 23.54 4.31 12.70 33.02 
       






Table 3. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status, adjusted for selection into employment, Men (N=2885) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
 Full MIPEX: Anti-
discrimination 




Low education -10.579*** -10.997*** -11.099*** -11.006*** -11.019*** 
 (0.824) (0.819) (0.817) (0.813) (0.811) 
Muslim -3.493*** -3.555*** -3.914*** -3.863*** -3.930*** 
 (0.935) (0.944) (0.915) (0.904) (0.925) 
Natives’ average ISEI -0.412 -0.059 -0.450 -0.562 -0.464 
 (0.701) (0.751) (0.769) (0.751) (0.758) 
MIPEX measures      
Antidiscrimination 1.984** 1.621**    
 (0.611) (0.556)    
Conversion credentials 0.914  -0.552   
 (0.725)  (0.490)   
Labor market rights -1.265   -1.153+  
 (0.826)   (0.687)  
Job support -1.653+    -0.548 
 (0.847)    (0.589) 
Institutional measures      
Size Manual Sector -2.503+ -2.530 -4.641*** -4.287*** -4.814*** 
 (1.480) (1.572) (1.359) (1.287) (1.340) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -0.922 -0.965+ -0.431 -0.936+ -0.245 
 (0.631) (0.530) (0.513) (0.561) (0.582) 
Constant 44.227*** 43.921*** 43.253*** 43.635*** 43.203*** 
 (1.263) (1.331) (1.765) (1.481) (1.806) 
Selection equation      
Low education  -0.178** -0.177** -0.173** -0.174** -0.173** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Muslim -0.148** -0.149** -0.151** -0.151** -0.151** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.121*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
Social Expenditure as % of GDP -0.090** -0.088** -0.084* -0.085** -0.084* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
2 
 
Access to social security (MIPEX) 0.096** 0.095** 0.097* 0.095* 0.097* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Constant 0.611*** 0.608*** 0.606*** 0.609*** 0.606*** 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105) 










rho -0.211 -0.180 -0.091 -0.125 -0.089 
χ2 test of independence of equations 8.682 4.930 0.229 0.931 0.197 
P-value of  χ2 test 0.003 0.026 0.633 0.335 0.657 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round. Full 
results provided in Online Appendix. N of men in employment=2018. 






Table 4. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status, adjusted for selection into employment, Women (N=3291). 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 








Low education -13.365*** -13.863*** -14.271*** -14.138*** -14.220*** 
 (0.895) (0.867) (0.896) (0.872) (0.889) 
Muslim -2.348 -2.497 -3.496* -3.351+ -3.543* 
 (1.689) (1.692) (1.750) (1.735) (1.757) 
Natives’ average ISEI 0.427 0.832 0.267 0.085 0.201 
 (0.612) (0.691) (0.756) (0.727) (0.722) 
MIPEX measures      
Antidiscrimination 2.900*** 2.363***    
 (0.735) (0.713)    
Conversion credentials 1.817+  -0.266   
 (0.970)  (0.568)   
Labor market rights -1.841*   -1.355+  
 (0.909)   (0.784)  
Job support -2.309*    -0.481 
 (0.961)    (0.600) 
Institutional measures      
Size Manual Sector -0.483 -0.457 -3.800* -3.535+ -4.043* 
 (1.992) (2.225) (1.857) (1.827) (1.878) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -1.984** -2.008** -1.196* -1.654* -1.021 
 (0.736) (0.662) (0.607) (0.643) (0.714) 
Constant 45.120*** 44.511*** 43.363*** 43.722*** 43.359*** 
 (1.518) (1.597) (1.798) (1.744) (1.796) 
Selection equation      
Low education  -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Muslim -0.397*** -0.399*** -0.404*** -0.404*** -0.403*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.083* -0.083* -0.085* -0.086* -0.085* 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Social Expenditure as % of GDP -0.064+ -0.061+ -0.056+ -0.057+ -0.056+ 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
4 
 
Access to social security (MIPEX) 0.080** 0.078** 0.078* 0.077* 0.078* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Constant -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 










rho -0.340 -0.312 -0.231 -0.240 -0.233 
χ2 test of independence of eqns 25.592 17.273 4.098 5.053 4.140 
P-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.025 0.042 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round. Full 
results provided in Online Appendix. N of women in employment=1690 




Table 5. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status adjusting for 
selection into employment: Heterogeneous effects of antidiscrimination policies, Men 
(N=2885). 
 Model 1: No 
interactions 
Model 2: X 
Muslim 




Low education -10.997*** -11.086*** -11.002*** -11.077*** 
 (0.819) (0.819) (0.784) (0.786) 
Muslim -3.555*** -3.453*** -3.635*** -3.540*** 
 (0.944) (0.905) (0.948) (0.905) 
Natives’ average ISEI -0.059 -0.044 -0.070 -0.056 
 (0.751) (0.745) (0.747) (0.743) 
Antidiscrimination 1.621** 2.042*** 2.218*** 2.513*** 
 (0.556) (0.564) (0.657) (0.646) 
Antidiscrimination X Muslim  -1.974*  -1.673+ 
  (0.894)  (0.942) 
Antidiscrim X Low educated   -2.117** -1.899* 
   (0.733) (0.761) 
Size manual sector -2.530 -2.431 -2.349 -2.284 
 (1.572) (1.550) (1.604) (1.583) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -0.965+ -0.993+ -1.044+ -1.060* 
 (0.530) (0.526) (0.535) (0.532) 
Constant 43.921*** 43.872*** 44.025*** 43.973*** 
 (1.331) (1.330) (1.328) (1.330) 
Selection model     
Low education -0.177** -0.176** -0.177** -0.176** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Muslim -0.149** -0.149** -0.149** -0.149** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
Social Expenditure, % of GDP -0.088** -0.087** -0.088** -0.088** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Access to social security 0.095** 0.096** 0.095** 0.096** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Constant 0.608*** 0.607*** 0.608*** 0.607*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 








Rho -0.180 -0.177 -0.185 -0.182 
χ2 test, independence of eqns 4.930* 4.661* 5.471* 5.151* 
P-value of χ2 test 0.026 0.031 0.019 0.023 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round. N of men in employment=2018. 




Table 6. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status controlling for 
selection into employment: Heterogeneous effects of antidiscrimination policies, Women 
(N=3291) 
 Model 1: No 
interactions 
Model 2: X 
Muslim 




Low education -13.863*** -13.871*** -13.917*** -13.919*** 
 (0.867) (0.867) (0.864) (0.863) 
Muslim -2.497 -2.511 -2.498 -2.503 
 (1.692) (1.717) (1.685) (1.712) 
Natives’ average ISEI 0.832 0.831 0.804 0.803 
 (0.691) (0.692) (0.690) (0.690) 
MIPEX: Antidiscrimination 2.363*** 2.376*** 2.515*** 2.519*** 
 (0.713) (0.719) (0.755) (0.759) 
Antidiscrim X Muslim  -0.184  -0.068 
  (1.502)  (1.502) 
Antidiscrim X Low Educated   -0.647 -0.641 
   (0.842) (0.844) 
Size Manual Sector -0.457 -0.458 -0.398 -0.399 
 (2.225) (2.226) (2.238) (2.239) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -2.008** -2.006** -2.011** -2.010** 
 (0.662) (0.662) (0.659) (0.660) 
Constant 44.511*** 44.512*** 44.534*** 44.534*** 
 (1.597) (1.595) (1.596) (1.595) 
Selection equation     
Low educated -0.259*** -0.259*** -0.259*** -0.259*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Muslim -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.399*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Unemployment rate (regional) -0.083* -0.083* -0.083* -0.083* 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Social Expenditure as % of GDP -0.061+ -0.061+ -0.061+ -0.061+ 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Access to social security 0.078** 0.079** 0.079** 0.079** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Constant -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 








Rho -0.312 -0.312 -0.314 -0.314 
χ2 test of independence of eqns 17.273 17.310 17.680 17.673 
P-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round. N of women in employment=1690. 
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immigrants’ labor market attainment in Europe  
Online Appendix 
 
Full references for individual-level data sources examined 
 
European Social Survey Round 1 Data. 2002. Data file edition 6.6. NSD - Norwegian Centre 
for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS1-2002. 
European Social Survey Round 2 Data. 2004. Data file edition 3.6. NSD - Norwegian Centre 
for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS2-2004. 
European Social Survey Round 3 Data. 2006. Data file edition 3.7. NSD - Norwegian Centre 
for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS3-2006. 
European Social Survey Round 4 Data. 2008. Data file edition 4.5. NSD - Norwegian Centre 
for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS4-2008. 
European Social Survey Round 5 Data. 2010. Data file edition 3.4. NSD - Norwegian Centre 
for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS 
ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS5-2010. 
European Social Survey Round 6 Data. 2012. Data file edition 2.4. NSD - Norwegian Centre 




Table A1. Under-coverage due to language: ratio of omitted cases on the basis of lack of host 















Austria 0.000 0.000 0.078    0.017 
Belgium 0.190 0.199 0.213 0.223 0.226 0.159 0.197 
Switzerland 0.374 0.091 0.112 0.118 0.123 0.151 0.149 
Czech Rep  0.004  0.007 0.000 0.046 0.011 
Germany 0.143 0.172 0.121 0.229 0.216 0.227 0.189 
Denmark 0.000 0.105 0.144 0.235 0.183 0.172 0.138 
Estonia  0.000 0.024 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.007 
Spain 0.137 0.021 0.068 0.044 0.055 0.054 0.057 
Finland 0.135 0.129 0.259 0.248 0.234 0.240 0.223 
France 0.099 0.131 0.135 0.119 0.188 0.021 0.113 
UK 0.149 0.123 0.127 0.109 0.063 0.057 0.101 
Greece 0.020 0.052  0.071 0.120  0.069 
Hungary 0.000 0.000 0.128 0.102 0.055 0.000 0.039 
Ireland 0.000 0.052 0.038 0.153 0.093 0.135 0.101 
Italy 0.020 0.000    0.102 0.055 
Luxembourg 0.000 0.000     0.000 
Netherlands 0.161 0.149 0.187 0.241 0.179 0.256 0.199 
Norway 0.160 0.099 0.124 0.198 0.168 0.171 0.153 
Poland 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.019 
Portugal 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.034 0.010 0.006 0.016 
Sweden 0.137 0.140 0.125 0.106 0.160 0.217 0.154 
Slovenia 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.157 0.148 0.015 0.056 
Slovakia  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
Total 0.096 0.076 0.105 0.120 0.118 0.118 0.106 





Table A2. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status, adjusted for 
selection into employment. Robustness check for noncoverage due to language barriers: 
Men 







  (Model 1 
Table 3) 
 (Model 4 
Table 5) 
 
Low education -10.579*** -10.670*** -11.077*** -11.135*** 
 (0.824) (0.820) (0.786) (0.788) 
Muslim -3.493*** -3.424*** -3.540*** -3.457*** 
 (0.935) (0.953) (0.905) (0.919) 
Natives’ average ISEI -0.412 -0.497 -0.056 -0.134 
 (0.701) (0.714) (0.743) (0.758) 
MIPEX measures     
Antidiscrimination 1.984** 1.926** 2.513*** 2.475*** 
 (0.611) (0.619) (0.646) (0.661) 
Conversion credentials 0.914 0.852   
 (0.725) (0.745)   
Labor market rights -1.265 -1.303   
 (0.826) (0.823)   
Job support -1.653+ -1.596+   
 (0.847) (0.871)   
MIPEX Antidiscrimination X 
Muslim 
  -1.673+ -1.675+ 
   (0.942) (0.943) 
MIPEX Job support X Low 
Educated 
  -1.899* -1.857* 
   (0.761) (0.765) 
Institutional measures     
Size Manual Sector -2.503+ -2.699+ -2.284 -2.443 
 (1.480) (1.503) (1.583) (1.601) 
Employment regulation 
(rigidity) 
-0.922 -0.922 -1.060* -1.039+ 
 (0.631) (0.637) (0.532) (0.538) 
Constant 44.227*** 44.301*** 43.973*** 44.055*** 
 (1.263) (1.287) (1.330) (1.359) 
Selection equation     
Low education  -0.178** -0.183** -0.176** -0.181** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
Muslim -0.148** -0.149** -0.149** -0.149** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.116*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Social Expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.090** -0.088** -0.088** -0.086** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Access to social security 
(MIPEX) 
0.096** 0.091* 0.096** 0.090* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.013 -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Constant 0.611*** 0.608*** 0.607*** 0.604*** 
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 (0.101) (0.097) (0.101) (0.097) 








rho -0.211 -0.216 -0.182 -0.188 
χ2 test of independence of 
equations 
8.682** 9.374 5.151 5.543 
P-value of χ2 test 0.003 0.002 0.023 0.019 
N 2885 2885 2885 2885 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table A3. Heckman regression of immigrants’ socio-economic status, adjusted for 
selection into employment. Robustness check for noncoverage due to language barriers: 
Women 







  (Model 1 
Table 4) 
 (Model 4 
Table 6) 
 
Low education -13.365*** -13.342*** -13.919*** -13.867*** 
 (0.895) (0.895) (0.863) (0.868) 
Muslim -2.348 -2.479 -2.503 -2.626 
 (1.689) (1.714) (1.712) (1.735) 
Natives’ average ISEI 0.427 0.388 0.803 0.757 
 (0.612) (0.621) (0.690) (0.698) 
MIPEX measures     
Antidiscrimination 2.900*** 2.826*** 2.519*** 2.470** 
 (0.735) (0.745) (0.759) (0.773) 
Conversion credentials 1.817+ 1.804+   
 (0.970) (0.989)   
Labor market rights -1.841* -1.851*   
 (0.909) (0.909)   
Job support -2.309* -2.273*   
 (0.961) (0.978)   
MIPEX Antidiscrimination X 
Muslim 
  -0.068 0.018 
   (1.502) (1.541) 
MIPEX Job support X Low 
Educated 
  -0.641 -0.637 
   (0.844) (0.837) 
Institutional measures     
Size Manual Sector -0.483 -0.660 -0.399 -0.533 
 (1.992) (1.997) (2.239) (2.235) 
Employment regulation 
(rigidity) 
-1.984** -2.034** -2.010** -2.068** 
 (0.736) (0.730) (0.660) (0.660) 
Constant 45.120*** 45.161*** 44.534*** 44.605*** 
 (1.518) (1.503) (1.595) (1.574) 
Selection equation     
Low education  -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.259*** -0.260*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Muslim -0.397*** -0.393*** -0.399*** -0.395*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.083* -0.085* -0.083* -0.085* 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Social Expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.064+ -0.065+ -0.061+ -0.062+ 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Access to social security 
(MIPEX) 
0.080** 0.077** 0.079** 0.075** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Constant -0.011 0.008 -0.013 0.005 
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 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 








rho -0.340 -0.341 -0.314 -0.315 
χ2 test of independence of 
equations 
25.592 25.060 17.673 17.328 
P-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 3291 3291 3291 3291 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round.  






Table A4: Full model with all MIPEX measures, with restrictions by length of stay and 
speaking host country language at home: Men 
 Full  
(Model 1, 
Table 3) 
Excluding those who 
arrived 5 or fewer years 
ago 
Excluding 
those who do 




Low education -10.579*** -11.106*** -9.800*** 
 (0.824) (0.935) (1.150) 
Muslim -3.493*** -3.931*** -4.958*** 
 (0.935) (1.032) (1.409) 
Natives’ average ISEI -0.412 -0.516 0.090 
 (0.701) (0.740) (1.182) 
MIPEX measures    
Antidiscrimination 1.984** 2.129** 2.493* 
 (0.611) (0.664) (0.969) 
Conversion credentials 0.914 -0.201 0.789 
 (0.725) (0.912) (1.110) 
Labor market rights -1.265 -0.398 -0.417 
 (0.826) (1.038) (1.479) 
Job support -1.653+ -0.480 -1.535 
 (0.847) (1.044) (1.438) 
Institutional measures    
Size Manual Sector -2.503+ -2.214 -1.959 
 (1.480) (1.666) (2.301) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -0.922 -0.925 -1.072 
 (0.631) (0.732) (0.892) 
Constant 44.227*** 43.786*** 43.929*** 
 (1.263) (1.310) (1.526) 
Selection equation    
Low education  -0.178** -0.225** -0.229* 
 (0.059) (0.074) (0.096) 
Muslim -0.148** -0.199** -0.154+ 
 (0.057) (0.075) (0.088) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.116*** -0.168*** -0.152*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.045) 
Social Expenditure as % of GDP -0.090** -0.092** -0.076+ 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.042) 
Access to social security (MIPEX) 0.096** 0.108** 0.132** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.044) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.013 0.008 -0.025 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.043) 
Constant 0.611*** 0.883*** 0.579*** 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.126) 






rho -0.211 -0.153 -0.143 
χ2 test of independence of equations 8.682 1.249  
 
0.821 
P-value of χ2 test 0.003 0.264 0.365 
N 2885 2218 1493 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round.  
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Table A5: Full model with all MIPEX measures, with restrictions by length of stay and 
speaking host country language at home: Women 
 Full  
(Model 1 
Table 4) 
Excluding those who 
arrived 5 or fewer years 
ago 
Excluding 
those who do 




Low education -13.365*** -13.823*** -13.166*** 
 (0.895) (1.044) (1.289) 
Muslim -2.348 -2.275 1.073 
 (1.689) (1.675) (2.639) 
Natives’ average ISEI 0.427 0.592 1.914** 
 (0.612) (0.688) (0.726) 
MIPEX measures    
Antidiscrimination 2.900*** 3.034*** 3.623*** 
 (0.735) (0.835) (0.945) 
Conversion credentials 1.817+ 0.760 1.211 
 (0.970) (1.059) (0.984) 
Labor market rights -1.841* -1.906* -1.061 
 (0.909) (0.886) (0.931) 
Job support -2.309* -1.203 -2.254* 
 (0.961) (1.109) (1.092) 
Institutional measures    
Size Manual Sector -0.483 0.871 2.972 
 (1.992) (2.153) (2.124) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -1.984** -2.106* -2.022* 
 (0.736) (0.873) (0.891) 
Constant 45.120*** 44.167*** 43.508*** 
 (1.518) (1.592) (2.145) 
Selection equation    
Low education  -0.261*** -0.340*** -0.222** 
 (0.058) (0.066) (0.069) 
Muslim -0.397*** -0.450*** -0.398** 
 (0.078) (0.089) (0.125) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.083* -0.093* -0.075+ 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.041) 
Social Expenditure as % of GDP -0.064+ -0.063+ -0.062+ 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) 
Access to social security (MIPEX) 0.080** 0.091** 0.065+ 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.010 -0.016 -0.033 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.039) 
Constant -0.011 0.107 0.067 
 (0.100) (0.093) (0.084) 






rho -0.340 -0.363 -0.218 
χ2 test of independence of equations 25.592*** 19.465***  
 
2.439 
P-value of χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.118 
N 3291 2522 1954 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home, country of origin HDI, ESS round.  
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Table A6. Full model with heterogeneous effects, with restrictions by length of stay and 
speaking host country language at home: Men. 
 Full model  








those who do 
not speak the 
host language 
at home 
Low education -11.077*** -11.413*** -10.240*** 
 (0.786) (0.895) (1.128) 
Muslim -3.540*** -3.954*** -4.922*** 
 (0.905) (1.030) (1.388) 
Natives’ average ISEI -0.056 -0.289 0.406 
 (0.743) (0.730) (1.191) 
Antidiscrimination 2.513*** 2.989*** 2.824*** 
 (0.646) (0.710) (0.791) 
Antidiscrimination X Muslim -1.673+ -1.712 -2.315 
 (0.942) (1.110) (1.640) 
Antidiscrim X Low educated -1.899* -2.169** -2.313* 
 (0.761) (0.828) (0.988) 
Size manual sector -2.284 -1.805 -1.690 
 (1.583) (1.649) (2.387) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -1.060* -0.983 -1.535+ 
 (0.532) (0.641) (0.827) 
Constant 43.973*** 43.629*** 44.008*** 
 (1.330) (1.415) (1.548) 
Selection model    
Low education -0.176** -0.223** -0.228* 
 (0.060) (0.074) (0.096) 
Muslim -0.149** -0.199** -0.154+ 
 (0.057) (0.075) (0.088) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.117*** -0.169*** -0.152*** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.045) 
Social Expenditure, % of GDP -0.088** -0.091* -0.076+ 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) 
Access to social security 0.096** 0.109** 0.132** 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.044) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.014 0.007 -0.025 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.044) 
Constant 0.607*** 0.881*** 0.578*** 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.125) 






Rho -0.182 -0.130 -0.137 
χ2 test, independence of eqns 5.151 0.675 0.783 
P-value of χ2 test 0.023 0.411 0.376 
N 2885 2218 1493 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home (except for Model 4), country of origin HDI, ESS round.  




Table A7. Full model with heterogeneous effects, with restrictions by length of stay and 
speaking host country language at home: Women 
 Full model  








those who do 
not speak the 
host language 
at home 
Low education -13.919*** -14.216*** -13.771*** 
 (0.863) (1.007) (1.250) 
Muslim -2.503 -2.458 1.239 
 (1.712) (1.678) (2.607) 
Natives’ average ISEI 0.803 1.036 2.241** 
 (0.690) (0.716) (0.775) 
Antidiscrimination 2.519*** 3.033*** 3.132*** 
 (0.759) (0.842) (0.882) 
Antidiscrimination X Muslim -0.068 -0.795 -1.736 
 (1.502) (1.422) (3.107) 
Antidiscrim X Low educated -0.641 -0.656 -0.545 
 (0.844) (0.950) (1.044) 
Size manual sector -0.399 1.093 2.766 
 (2.239) (2.215) (2.276) 
Employment regulation (rigidity) -2.010** -1.777* -2.410*** 
 (0.660) (0.778) (0.708) 
Constant 44.534*** 43.668*** 43.082*** 
 (1.595) (1.667) (2.276) 
Selection model    
Low education -0.259*** -0.340*** -0.222** 
 (0.058) (0.066) (0.069) 
Muslim -0.399*** -0.451*** -0.399** 
 (0.078) (0.089) (0.125) 
Regional unemployment rate -0.083* -0.093* -0.076+ 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.040) 
Social Expenditure, % of GDP -0.061+ -0.060+ -0.060+ 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) 
Access to social security 0.079** 0.089** 0.065+ 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) 
Access X Social expenditure -0.011 -0.016 -0.034 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.040) 
Constant -0.013 0.104 0.067 
 (0.100) (0.093) (0.084) 






Rho -0.314 -0.349 -0.200 
χ2 test, independence of eqns 17.673*** 15.713*** 1.604 
P-value of  χ2 test 0.000 0.000 0.205 
N 3291 2522 1954 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models additionally control for age, time since arrival, 
language at home (except for Model 4), country of origin HDI, ESS round.  
+ p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
